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a b s t r a c t
Dairy farms were identiﬁed, which can be included in a contingency plan set up to prevent or mitigate
the consequences of deliberate contamination of a food supply chain. The deliberate introduction of a
contamination into the supply chain of milk was simulated in a scenario where milk producers serve as
the entry sources and consumers of milk represent the target to be affected by the contamination. It is
shown that the entry sources have an impact on the damage caused, i.e. in terms of the number of
consumers reached. A contingency plan is provided that contains a list of entry sources ranked according
to their impact on the damage to consumers. To generate this list, a computer program was developed
that simulates the impact of the contaminations on consumers via the trade of contaminated milk.
Possible variations in the trade links between milk producers, dairies and consumers as well as between
dairies are considered. It is investigated how these trade links alter the generated list of entry sources.
The results indicate that, regardless of the actual milk trade ﬂow, control measures should be
introduced on 39% of the milk producers in order to minimize the damage. The identiﬁcation of suitable
entry sources may help risk managers to focus on these farms in a contingency plan that improves the
sensitivity of control activities related to deliberate contamination.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Risks in supply chains can come from a large number of sources
[1–9] and thus their prevention leads to a broader view of risk
management [10]. For example in the study of Wu and Olson [11],
ﬁnanced risks of enterprises were addressed and models were
applied in order to support their investment decision-making [11].
Other studies estimated the risks of a food contamination in order
to provide the risk-informed decision-making on food safety
management issues [12,13]. However, Enterprise Risk and Enter-
prise Risk Management (ERM) have attracted a great deal of
attention, especially in recent years [14]. But there are slightly
different views on ERM [14,15]. In general, ERM is deﬁned as a
systematic and integrating approach to managing all risk factors
which an organization is faced with [15] and thus represents the
most effective way for companies to manage or mitigate their risks
[10]. Besides [15], COSO [16] deﬁnes ERM as “a process [that is]
effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity,
and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reason-
able assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”.
Similarly, Olson and Wu [17] deﬁne ERM as “the integrated process
of identiﬁcation, analysis and either acceptance or mitigation of
uncertainty in investment decision making.” Against this theore-
tical background, our research framework rests on the deﬁnition of
risk management provided by [17] with a focus on the decision-
making of supplier selection under consideration of their vulner-
ability to terrorist entry sources. The food supply chains are
tempting targets for terrorists as attacks on these systems may
destabilize the economy and disrupt the ﬂow of foods [18].
Defense preparedness in this ﬁeld is often in the hand of the
private sector [19]. For example, companies in the food sector
apply for certiﬁcations of their food defense management strate-
gies [20]. Rasco and Bledsoe [19] claimed that about 80% of
consumers consider the food supply as vulnerable to attacks.
Several incidents of intentional contamination in the food supply
chain underline its vulnerability [21–25]. For instance, at least 751
people were affected due to deliberate contamination of salad bars
in Oregon, USA, in 1984 by members of a religious commune [25–
27]. Another case occurred in 2003, where approximately 100
people were affected after consumption of ground beef that had
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/omega
Omega
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2015.08.002
0305-0483/& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.09.011
n Corresponding author at: University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Institute
for Veterinary Public Health, Veterinärplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria.
Tel.: þ43 1 250773531, þ43 1 250773590.
E-mail address: Beate.Pinior@vetmeduni.ac.at (B. Pinior).
Omega 57 (2015) 114–122
been contaminated by a supermarket employee [25,28]. According
to Sobel et al. [29], an intentional contamination of the food supply
may be similar to an accidental contamination. In this context, the
likely size of damage caused by an attack can be inferred from
observed unintentional foodborne disease outbreaks [29]. In 1994,
for example, a large outbreak of Salmonella enteritidis in the United
States affected approximately 224,000 people after accidental
contamination of pasteurized liquid ice cream [22,29,30].
However, the above mentioned studies are based on the
assumption that the selection of the entry sources for a deliberate
contamination of the supply chain can be random, because the
consequences of deliberate of accidental contaminations cannot be
distinguished from each other.
In this paper, we concentrate on the hypothetical threat posed
by a deliberate introduction of a pathogen or toxins into the milk
supply chain. We focus on a scenario, where the milk producer
(dairy farm) is used as the entry source for a contamination and
where milk consumers are the target of the attack [13]. We assume
that a potential attacker would aim at reaching a maximum spread
of the contaminated milk and at using a minimum number of milk
producers as entry sources for the contamination. Ideally, the
attacker would aim at reaching the maximal spread of contami-
nated milk by contaminating the ﬁrst milk producer in the
network of milk trade. If the attacker was not stopped after the
ﬁrst assault, he would contaminate another milk producer as a
second entry sources if this contamination cause larger increase of
infected consumers compared to the ﬁrst entry sources. The
attacker has achieved his goal, when all consumers have been
supplied with the contaminated milk. Due to the fact that the milk
trade between milk producers, dairies and consumers as well as
between dairies in the milk supply chain is dynamic [31,32], we
hypothesize that trade links may inﬂuence the selection of milk
producers that are used as the entry sources for the contamination
by the attacker.
However, the most important task during a foodborne outbreak
is to identify the source of the food contamination and its entry
sources [33]. Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide the following
information for risk managers on the chosen scenario: Firstly,
which entry sources would be chosen by a hypothetical attacker, if
data on the commodity ﬂows became publicly available? Secondly,
how many entry sources would the attacker have to choose to
reach all consumers with contaminated milk in Germany? Thirdly,
in which sequence would an attacker choose potential entry
sources? Fourthly, are there milk producers who can be selected
independent of the ﬂow of milk to induce maximum damage?
Fifthly, in the context of ERM, what strategies can be derived to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of deliberate contamination
with scant resources? These questions were answered by propos-
ing a contingency plan.
To prevent that the results of this research are used as an
instruction for a potential attacker, we work with highly aggre-
gated and anonymous data. Moreover, we use a random gravity
model to generate the trade connections between the actors in the
milk supply chain. Furthermore, we focus on the spread of
hypothetically contaminated milk via trade. Our investigation does
take any features into account that are speciﬁc for particular milk
producers, such as bio-security measures. Nevertheless, we expect
that contamination of milk in dairy plants is less likely than in
farms due to restricted access to the dairy plants. Relevant
characteristics of milk, the kind of biological agents or toxins,
individual dispositions like the age of people [34–37] and internal
processes like pasteurization [38–43], which may inﬂuence the
vulnerability of the consumers to contamination, but also the
spread of contamination [32], are not considered in this paper.
2. Material and methods
2.1. The generation of the milk trade network
The underlying milk trade network has been described in detail
elsewhere [32]. In brief, the term “milk trade network” comprises
the trade connections between milk producers (P) and dairies (D),
dairies and consumers (C) and the trade connections between
dairies. On the one hand, the horizontal ﬂow of milk between
dairies (inter-dairy trade) and on the other hand, the vertical ﬂow
(without inter-dairy trade) between milk producers, dairies and
consumers is taken into account. All milk producers of a country
and all consumers of a municipality were aggregated into one milk
producer node or one consumer node, respectively. The milk trade
network consists of 12,597 nodes, with P¼294, D¼80 and
C¼12,223.
Data on the trade relations from milk producer nodes to dairy
nodes are available in accordance with the German law of market
regulations for goods (Marktordnungsmeldeverordnung). Infor-
mation on the trade connections between dairy nodes and con-
sumer nodes as well as between dairy nodes was not available and
these trade connections were predicted through a standard
randomized gravity model [32]. The standard randomized gravity
model [44–47] was based on the assumption that the probability
of two market actors trading with each other is proportional to the
supply and demand of the respective actors and indirectly propor-
tional to their distance to each other [32,46,48]. Further informa-
tion on the generation of the German milk trade network can be
found in [32]. However, different trade networks are required due
to the random nature of the model [32]. One hundred different
trade networks were therefore created, consisting of 50 trade
networks with inter-dairy trade and 50 without inter-dairy trade.
2.2. Greedy algorithm and objective functions
To identify the number and the rank-order of milk producer
nodes, which may cause maximum damage in terms of the
number of contaminated consumer nodes, the greedy algorithm
was used. This algorithm can solve optimization problems [49–51]
and is applied under the predetermined objective function to ﬁnd
the most appropriate milk producer nodes (P) as entry sources for
a contamination to cause maximum damage on the condition that
maximum spread of contaminated milk in association with a
maximum contaminated number of contaminated consumer
nodes (C), so that the number of milk producer nodes involved
in spreading the contamination is minimal (Eq. (1)).
max c : cAC; min p : p AP
  ; pAD; cAD;DAR
   ð1Þ
In this context, there is a second condition requiring that trade
connections between milk producer nodes and dairy nodes (pAD)
as well as between dairy nodes and consumer nodes (cAD) exist.
Furthermore, the condition should be reﬂexive and transitive (R),
as trade connections between dairy nodes should be considered in
our model. However, the objective function considers only the
trade volume (v) and the trade connections of the milk producer
nodes, their associated dairy nodes and the consumer nodes.
294 Candidate of entry sources were hypothetically contami-
nated in the computer simulations, selected and sorted according
to the extent of the resulting damage caused dependent on the
respective milk trade ﬂow.
The greedy algorithm starts with the identiﬁcation of the
candidate set of solutions. A candidate is selected for the solution
when it maximizes the selection function. Let S represent the
ordered set of selected candidates and si is a member of this
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ordered set at position i. Each member of the set is assigned a
value Δv(si). This value represents the additional weighted num-
ber of contaminated consumer nodes, when the milk producer
node s is added to the set of solutions. The weight (wi¼ i1)
depends on the position (i) of the milk producer node in the
ranked list of solutions (i¼1,…, n). With respect to the objective
function, a milk producer node is only added to the list if Siþ14Si
with Si ¼
Pn
i Δv si wið Þ. Therefore, the greedy algorithm searches
for the “best” milk producer node according to the number of
contaminated consumer nodes, sets this milk producer node on
the ﬁrst position in the list of potential entry sources and then
follows with the “next-best” milk producer node (Fig. 1). As a
consequence, every place in the list can be ﬁlled by only one milk
producer node. The greedy algorithm cannot handle the theore-
tical case where two milk producer nodes have exactly the same
value and should therefore occupy the same place in the list of
potential entry sources.
The algorithm stops when Si cannot be improved any more or, in
other words, when all consumer nodes (C) are contaminated (Fig. 1).
The scenario, in which all consumers are reached, represents a worst-
case situation. The greedy algorithmwas applied for two kinds of milk
trade networks, one with inter-dairy trade and one without. We
therefore obtained two contingency plans over 50 simulations for
each kind of the milk trade network. One simulation represents one
sub-trade network.
To answer the question, whether milk producer nodes can be used
regardless of the ﬂow of milk as appropriate entry sources for a
contamination, a comparison between the two contingency plans
according to the most commonly observed portals of entry was
conducted. To achieve a better comparison between the milk producer
nodes, which may occur in both contingency plans, and those, which
are only included in one of the contingency plans, the impact of these
milk producer nodes for the damage situation was determined with
Eq. (2).
IðpÞ ¼
Xr
i ¼ 1
hðrÞngðrÞ ð2Þ
The impact of milk producer nodes I(p) is calculated using its rank (r)
(position) in the ordered contingency plan determined by the greedy
algorithm for each of the considered random networks. Let h(r) be the
frequency of (p) at position (r) using all simulation results, where g(r)
is a weight, g(r)¼(rþ1) i. The value of r is determined by the greedy
algorithm and resembles the maximum size (length of the contin-
gency plan) of the best-ordered milk producer nodes in random
network considered.
3. Results
The contingency plan includes the number and rank-order of milk
producer nodes for inducing the maximum damage situation as well
as the associated number of contaminated consumer nodes
(Figs. 2 and 3) for the two kinds of trade networks (with and without
inter-dairy trade). In Figs. 2b and 3b, each line represents a simulation
process of a total of 50 simulations. Each line represents the number of
milk producer nodes which are involved in the worst-case situation
per simulation. Furthermore, each column shows the rank of the milk
producer nodes for the worst-case situation according to the reached
number of consumer nodes. Figs. 2a and 3a depict the damage
situation in respect to hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes
in association with the rank-order of the milk producer nodes.
Fig. 1. Steps of the greedy algorithm (without inter-dairy trade). Step (1) Contamination of a milk producer node and calculating the number of consumer nodes that can be
hypothetically contaminated (absolute); Step (2): Selecting the milk producer nodes that have reached the maximum number of consumer nodes. The milk producer node
with the maximum number of infected consumer nodes was used as a baseline for further evaluations of milk producer nodes; Step (3): Select the second-best milk producer
node, on the condition that it has infected other consumer nodes than the ﬁrst milk producer node (maximum increase for the ﬁrst milk producer node); Step (4): Sorting
the milk producer nodes according to extent of damage leading to a rank-order of the milk producer nodes in the contingency plan.
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Fig. 3. The contingency plan without inter-dairy trade in association with the hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes. (a) Size of the damage situation with respect to
the number of hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes per rank-order of milk producer nodes. Each point represents the damage caused by a milk producer node in the
underlying column of (b). (b) Results of 50 simulations. Each line shows the number of milk producer nodes that are involved in the worst-case situation per simulation; each
column shows the rank-order of the milk producer nodes for the worst-case situation according to reached number of consumer nodes. The milk producers on the ﬁrst rank
caused the maximum damage situation. The milk producer nodes on the second place caused the largest increase of infected consumer nodes compared to the ﬁrst milk
producer nodes.
Fig. 2. Contingency plan taking inter-dairy trade into account in associationwith the hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes. (a) Size of the damage situationwith respect to the
number of hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes per rank-order of the milk producer nodes. Each point represents the damage caused by a milk producer node in the
underlying column of (b). (b) Results of a total of 50 simulations. Each line shows the number of milk producer nodes that are involved in the worst-case situation per simulation; each
column shows the rank-order of the milk producer nodes for theworst-case situation according to reached number of consumer nodes. Themilk producers on the ﬁrst rank caused the
maximum damage situation. The milk producer nodes on the second place caused the largest increase of infected consumer nodes compared to the ﬁrst milk producer nodes.
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When the inter-dairy trade structures are taken into account, the
entire contingency plan includes 86 (29.2%) different milk producer
nodes from a total of 294 (100%). For all 50 simulations, the greedy
algorithm calculated that the minimum required number of milk
producer nodes to achieve the worst-case situation was seven and
that the maximum number of milk producer nodes was 13 (Fig. 2b).
On average, by the introduction of a contamination into nine milk
producer nodes a worst-case situation can be introduced. More than
94% of the consumer nodes could be contaminated upon introduc-
tion of the hypothetical pathogen or toxins into the milk producer
nodes on the ﬁrst rank of the contingency plan (Fig. 2b). The milk
producer nodes on the second rank led to a further increase of the
damage situation of 1–2% (Fig. 2a). All subsequent milk producer
nodes induce a minimal increase in the number of contaminated
consumer nodes by 1–4%.
One milk producer node (ID: 294) was identiﬁed in 49 out of 50
simulations (Fig. 2b). Two milk producer nodes (ID: 66 and 500)
showed up in 89% of all simulations. The remaining 83 milk
producer nodes appeared on average 3.6 times in the simulations.
In all simulations, 27 different milk producer nodes appeared only
once (Fig. 2b).
One milk producer node (ID: 294) was on the ﬁrst rank in 26 of
50 simulations (Fig. 2b). In all remaining simulations, this milk
producer node ranked second (n¼13) or third rank (n¼10) in the
contingency plan. Such “direct neighborhood” ranking of milk
producer nodes in the contingency plan was observed for 68
(79.1%) nodes in all simulations (Fig. 2b).
If the inter-dairy trade is neglected, a worst-case situation could be
caused on average by 18.4 (minimum 15, maximum 20) contaminated
milk producer nodes (Fig. 3b). The contingency plan contained a total
of 76 (25.8%) different milk producer nodes (Fig. 3b). The milk
producer nodes with the highest rank in the contigency plan could
infect more than 68% of all consumer nodes (Fig. 3). The milk producer
nodes on the second rank led to a maximal further increase of the
damage situation of 12.2% (Fig. 3a). In contrast to the results for
scenario with the inter-dairy trade, we always found the same milk
producer node (ID: 100) on the ﬁrst rank in all simulations in the
scenario without inter-dairy trade (Fig. 3b). Moreover, three milk
producer nodes were found in all 50 performed simulations, but on
the ranks 2–5. All other 72 milk producer nodes were identiﬁed ten
times on average in the simulations on the ranks 2–20.
A “direct neighborhood” ranking of milk producer nodes in the
contigency plan without inter-dairy trade was identiﬁed for 63
(82.9%) nodes in all simulations (Fig. 3b).
The contingency plan without inter-dairy trade contained 29
milk producer nodes that were not included in the plan that took
inter-dairy trade into account (Fig. 4b). These milk producer nodes
were on average 7.7 times included in all simulations and were
between ranks 2 and 19 in the rank-order. Conversely, 39 milk
producer nodes existed in the contingency plan with inter-dairy
trade that were not included in the plan without inter-dairy trade
(Fig. 4b). These milk producer nodes had ranks between 1 and 9 in
the rank-order and appeared on average 3.4 times in the simula-
tions. 64% of these milk producer nodes were involved twice at the
maximum in all performed simulations.
In order to determine the impact of the milk producer nodes
for a contingency plan, we used the maximum number of
participating milk producer nodes (r¼20) as obtained from the
greedy-algorithm calculation (Fig. 3b). In this context, the max-
imum impact (Imax(p)) of a milk producer in the contingency plan
is 2000, if the milk producer node is identiﬁed on the ﬁrst rank
(rmax¼20) in all 100 simulations. Fig. 4a shows the common
intersection of the both contingency plans. 47 (29.0%) of the milk
producer nodes were present in both plans and therefore relevant
regardless of the milk ﬂow. The maximum impact of a milk
producer node in the contingency plan was 1220 and the
minimum 14. The average impact of the milk producer nodes
was 260. If the impact of the common milk producer nodes in the
contingency plan is compared separately for the trade ﬂows with
and without inter-dairy trade, it becomes clear that the milk
producer nodes that have a high impact in the trade network
without inter-dairy trade do not have the same level of importance
for the trade ﬂows with inter-dairy trade (Fig. 4a). No clear
correlation (R¼0.013) existed between these milk producer nodes
regarding their impact on a damage situation. In this context, the
milk producer nodes in the plan without inter-dairy trade had a
33.5% higher impact on the damage than the nodes in the list with
inter-dairy trade.
Fig. 4b shows that the milk producer nodes in the contingency
plan with inter-dairy trade possess on average half of the impact
for a damage situation as the milk producer nodes in the
contingency plan without inter-dairy trade.
4. Discussion
The assessment of the consequence of a deliberate or accidental
release of a contamination in a food supply chain can only be done
by computer simulation. The simulation results obtained in this
study are only valid for the scenario described in the introduction
and summarized in Eq. (1).
Conﬁdential handling of data on supply structures related to
deliberate contamination is important. This implies to realize the
balancing act between creating knowledge for risk managers and
to avoid creating instructions for an attack. On the one hand, the
information provided for risk managers should answer the ques-
tion “what should be done?” [52] in case of an attack or a threat of
an attack. On the other hand, risk managers who use the results of
simulation should understand the strengths and weaknesses of
simulation results to avoid incorrect conclusions [53].
The strengths of simulations result from the fact that new
insights for risk managers are provided, which cannot be offered
by other means.
Our results showed that 60% of the milk producer nodes are not
suitable as possible entry sources in our model because only 25.8%
(without inter-dairy trade n¼76) and 29.2% (with inter-dairy trade
n¼86) of the milk producer nodes as entry sources were identiﬁed in
a total of 294 possible entry sources for each contingency plan. 29% of
the milk producer nodes were present in both contingency plans and
therefore relevant regardless of the milk ﬂow. Especially the milk
producer node with the ID 100 proved as important for risk mangers
because this milk producer node was found in 66 out of 100
simulations as the “best” milk producer node for a maximum spread
of hypothetically contaminated milk. This milk producer represents a
suitable entry source regardless of the ﬂow of milk. Our ﬁndings
indicate that cost- and time-efﬁcient identiﬁcation of such milk
producer nodes (dairy farms) is possible if detailed trade data are
used in the simulation. This may help risk managers to identify critical
points with regard to the entry sources for a contamination in a food
supply chain.
In addition, our research has proven that different trade
structures have a signiﬁcant impact on the number and the
rank-order of selected entry sources for contaminations. Our
hypothesis, that the number and the rank-order of milk producer
nodes as entry sources for a contamination may vary due to the
different trade ﬂows of milk (Figs. 2b and 3b), was conﬁrmed and
can be underpinned by the following facts: First, the number of
milk producer nodes as portals of entry for a pathogen to induce a
worst-case situation varies within and between the contingency
plans per simulation (min: 7|13; max: 15|20). The entry sources
that exist regardless of the kind of trade, i.e. with or without inter-
dairy trade (Fig. 4a), have a very different impact on the damage
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situation. It is not possible to tell that milk producer nodes
identiﬁed as important in one of the contingency plans are also
important in the other plan or vice versa. The simulations showed
that trade between the dairies leads to a signiﬁcant change of the
potential entry sources for a contaminations. If the trade of milk
between dairies is taken into account (Fig. 2b), more diversity at
potential entry sources per rank-order becomes visible as com-
pared to the list without inter-dairy trade (Fig. 3b). This observa-
tion can be underpinned by the fact that there were 50% more
potential entry sources for contaminations on the ﬁrst 13 ranks
compared to the list of portals of entry for the network without
inter-dairy trade (Figs. 2b and 3b). The consequence of this large
number of entry sources for contaminations per rank is that no
general statement can be made, which allows to select milk
producer nodes that need to be monitored to mitigate the
maximum damage. One consequence of a non-speciﬁc selection
of the control points would be a delay in coping with the damage
situation. In this context, a potential attacker runs a higher risk to
select a milk producer node that is not relevant for the spread of
the contamination as the selection is highly dependent on the
respective milk trade ﬂow, in contrast to the contingency plan
without inter-dairy trade (Fig. 3b). Three milk producer nodes (ID:
100; 63; 47) appeared always on the same rank and on the ﬁrst
ranks in all simulations without inter-dairy trade. This means that
a potential attacker could reach almost all consumer nodes via
these entry sources. Milk producer nodes on the ﬁrst rank can
reach 68% of the consumer nodes (Fig. 3). The importance of these
milk producer nodes as entry sources can be explained by the fact
that these milk producer nodes delivered their milk to different
dairy nodes. In a previous study it was shown that milk producer
nodes delivered their milk on average to three different dairy
nodes whereas some milk producer nodes delivered to up to 20
different dairy nodes [31]. Consequently, more trade connections
in the milk trade network existed. If an attacker would choose a
milk producer node from the ﬁrst rank in the contingency plan
with inter-dairy trade, 94% of consumer nodes could be reached.
The importance of the milk producer nodes for the spread of the
contamination in the inter-dairy trade network was shown by
[32]. It was calculated that the spread of contaminated milk
through some milk producer nodes could be higher if trade
Fig. 4. Impact of milk producer nodes, (a) present in both contingency plans or (b) in only one of the contingency plans.
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between dairy nodes existed. Generally, the importance of the
inter-dairy trade for the spread of a contamination is illustrated by
the fact that 30% of the total milk production in Germany is traded
between dairies [31]. A detailed description of the German milk
supply chain can be found in [31].
One of the limitations of the model results from the fact that the
number of milk producer nodes not involved in the spread of a
contamination in our model can be less than 60%, because the greedy
algorithm cannot consider the theoretical case that two milk producer
nodes may cause exactly the same extent of damage. In contrast to the
model of Wein and Liu [13], our model does not include microbiology,
processing, time-resolved delivery structures and compliance with
existing security measures such as International Food Standard (IFS),
British Retail Consortium (BRC) or Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points (HACCP) etc., which may already exist at different levels of the
milk supply chain and could inﬂuence the dimension of potential
damage as well as the selection of the potential entry sources for
contaminations. Another limitation is that the hypothetical attacker
must process the complete data set to plan the attack beforehand and
implement the scenario, which is unlikely in reality. A further
limitation of this study is that the gravity model used to generate
the trade network was only based on three variables (supply, demand
and distances between actors), although it well known that additional
variables, such as the price of traded goods [44] are also important for
the decision whether or not trade relations between actors take place
[32]. An overview of the economic factors, which are essential for the
choice of supplier partners in dairy industry, is given by [54]. Apart
from economic factors, effects of terrorism on supplier selection
require more attention [55]. Whereby, selection of supplier is a
multi-criteria decision making [55–59].
However, it has been shown by this study that for the decision
makers the type and number of trading partners can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the range of a damage situation. Further-
more, the suppliers, which should ﬁnd more consideration in the
operational-control-system of the dairies, were illustrated by
means of the contingency plan. This information can inﬂuence
the decision making in the supplier selection process. The surveil-
lance activities for selected scenarios can be reduced by half by
decision makers, if current data on trade ﬂows are present.
Nonetheless, it was shown in this work that an increased trans-
parency or a high availability of data about the supply structure
can lead to a maximal damage with minimal efforts based on the
selection of suitable entry sources for a potential attacker. The
protection of supplier data is essential in order to avoid such a
scenario and therefore for food defense issues in the context
of ERM.
Further research will focus on the kind of agencies or speciﬁc
stages of the production process, which can inﬂuence the number
of consumers reached, the kind of selected entry sources for a
deliberate contamination and the assessment of the consequences
related to deliberate contamination. This will be done with the
help of the ﬁndings gained here.
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